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Medicaid is producing budgetary headaches all across the country. With
education, it is one of the two largest individual programs in most state
budgets, and it represents a growing share of total expenditures in every
single state. While direct general expenditures of state and local
governments grew over 200 percent between FY1975 and FY1989, Medicaid payments
soared 350 percent. Accordingly, the share of state and local spending
absorbed by Medicaid grew from 5 to 7 percent over this period.I As Map I
shows, this budgetary burden is greatest in some of the Northeastern states,
but, as Table A-1 indicates, Medicaid payments have grown fastest in several
of the Southern and Western states. With over 30 states projecting FY1992
budget deficits late the previous fiscal year, the pressures to restrain
Medicaid spending are intense. Richard G. Darman, U.S. Budget Director, has
described the situation: "Medicaid is severely straining most state budgets as
well as Federal resources .... The system cannot tolerate budget shocks of the
magnitude Medicaid has been providing." (Hilts 1991a)
"Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. Lawrence D. Herman provided
valuable research assistance. This study is an expansion of a chapter in
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Research Report No. 72, Massachusetts in the
]990s: The Role of State Government.
I Medicaid looms much larger in state than ]n state and local accounts..
Indeed., in FY1989 Medicaid absorbed 18 percent of all state direct general
expenditures. However, because states differ in the extent to which counties
and cities bear responsibility for Medicaid, cross-state comparisons should be
based on state and local spending.Map I Med~baid Paymenis as a Sham of
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Medicaid Payments Share of Stat~ and Local ~ ExpenddureNevertheless, the state and local government share of total U.S. health
care spending has actually declined since 1975. And Medicaid costs per
recipient have not increased as fast as personal health care costs per capita
over the last decade. Apparently, the states are being swept along on a
swelling tide of national health care spending that has risen almost 40
percent faster than GNP over the last 25 years. Just 6 percent of total
output in 1965, total health care expenditures now account for more than 12
percent of GNP, a considerably larger fraction than in any other
industrialized country.
This study will begin by reviewing why governments have a role in
providing ,health care for their citizens. The following sections will explain
why the Medicaid program has become a substantial burden for many state
governments and why that burden is likely to increase. The~study will then
examine why some states’ Medicaid expenditures are well above average and will
outline some choices that policymakers may be forced to consider in the
immediate future.
Because state policymakers have considerable discretion in determining
the scope of their state’s Medicaid program, one frequently discussed option
involves reducing existing benefits. For four representative states examined
in this study, eliminating all benefits permitted but not required by the
federal government would ostensibly reduce state government spending on
Medicaid by at least 40 to 50 percent. The cost--financial, medical and
emotional--of these publicsector savings would fall primarily on elderly and
disabled individuals whose assets had been depleted by uninsured medical and
long-term care expenses. However, some of these public sector savings would
undoubtedly resurface either within Medicaid itself or in other programs thatare fully state-funded. (The federal government reimburses the states for 50
to 80 percent of their Medicaid payments.) Some of these public sector
savings would also resurface as additional uncompensated care that would, in
turn, lead to increased charges to private patients and to higher insurance
premiums. In other words, individuals will pay for health care delivered to
the indigent either through higher tax bills or through higher medical and
insurance bills. Shifting costs between and within sectors does not eliminate
them.
If policymakers determine that a major restructuring of the Medicaid
program is unwise, they still have some room to maneuver. A remaining -- and
absolutely essential -- Qption involves promoting best=practice delivery and
reimbursement systems to minimize unneeded care and increase efficiency.
While the benefits of such administrative changes would take some time to
accrue, efficient delivery appears to make considerable difference to the per
recipient cost of the Medicaid program. However, because Medicaid operates as
part of state and national health care systems, it cannot be reformed in
isolation without creating serious access problems for the program’s
beneficiaries. Achieving ongoing savings within Medicaid requires controlling
costs throughout the health care system.
I. Why Government Has a Role in Health Care Finance
Governments generally play an important role in the provision of health
care. Indeed, in most developed countries-the government’s role is much
larger than it is here in the Un~ted States. Among the major developed
countries public financing accounted for 77 percent of all medical careexpenditures in 1987. ~In the United States th~ comparable figure was 41
percent (U.S. Congress 1990, p. 301).
Most basically, governments have an interest in the health of their
citizens--just as they do in the education of their citizens--because a
healthy population represents a more productive work force. Increased
productivity and other benefits of good health spill over from one individual
to other members of society without (full) compensation. Altruism, or
avoiding the cost of altruism~ offers another motive for government
involvement with~ health care. Most high-income societies do not allow sick
people to languish unattended; thus, governments either become the provider of
last resort (or, over time~ first resort) or they force/encourage people to
save against the risk of ill health.
The sizable uncertainties surrounding an individual’s need for health
care have led industrialized societies to pool their risks by developing
health insurance. Pooling risks allows a society to economize on the savings
required by the risk of ill health, compared with the amounts that would be
required if each individual were to self.insure. However, because individuals
left to their own devices tend to underestimate how much medical care they
.will need or what it will cost at that time~ they also tend to underinsure
(Summers 1989). In addition, insurance providers know less than the insured
about the likelihood ~f their needing health care. If adverse selection
occurs~ with only the riskiest individuals choosing to insur~e themselves, then
these insurance policies become very expensive~ and private markets may remain
underdeveloped. For all of these reasons~ government mandate or subsidization
of private health insurance represents one model of government involvement
with health care. The United States follows this tradition with much of itssocial insurance provided through the workplace in the form of mandatory
programs (Medicare, Part A) or subsidized fringe benefits (health insurance).
Accordingly, obtaining medical insurance and medical care becomes a serious
problem for the unemployed or self-employed.2
Because of the link between health insurance and the workplace found in
this country, the government pays directly for medical care for poor people
who cannot reasonably be expected to work. This group includes children and
their caretakers, the elderly, and the disabled. Medicaid is the means-tested
program providing this care.
When governments lift most of the cost of ill health from individuals--
either through government payment or private insurance--much unneeded medical
care may result. If patients bear no cost~ they will demand (in an economic
sense) any medical service that yields even a small benefit. If providers get
paid in full for any and all services rendered, they are likely to recommend
every procedure that might prove helpful in the smallest degree. Medical
ethics, professional pride, and malpractice suits reinforce this outcome.
Under these circumstances, then, the social costs of medical care are likely
to outstrip individua7 benefits by substantial amounts--especially given the
technological intensity of today’s medicine.
Whether governments pay for medical care directly (as in the United
Kingdom and Canada) or indirectly through subsidized health insurance (as in
the United States, at least in part), they are currently under pressure to
curb waste and rising health care costs. Government options include:
2 Employees of small business also have difficulty obtaining health
insurance and, thus, health care. Roughly 60 percent of the more than 35
million U.S. citizens without health insurance are either employed or are
dependents of employed people.I) asking consumers to share the costs through deductibles and co-payments;
2) forcing providers to share the risks, as in prepaid HMO programs;
3) rationing health care, as in the application of cost!benefit analysis.
Since cost!benefit spillovers and market failures appear to justify some
role for government in providing health care, the question becomes, which
level of government is most appropriate to the task? According to some
observers, the scope of the spillovers, the generality of the market failures,
and issues of equity suggest that the responsibility for setting health care
policy belongs with the national government.rather than at the state level.
Although regional differences in the need for medical facilities or in the
cost of health care services clearly e×isto a national program should be able
to account for such variations. A series of congressional mandates expanding
Medicaid coverage for poor children and, to a lesser extent, the elderly
suggest that national policymakers see a growing need for the federal
government ’to define minimum public sector responsibilities for health care.
On the other hand, advantages to be gained by locating responsibility
for health care (like education) at the state .(or local) level include
allowing for: 1) variations in the desired amount of public support~ 2)
differences in regional views concerning ethical issues (abortion, the right
to die, and so forth); and 3) experiments in administering the health c~re
system. With most societies groping to find some means of controlling
spiraling medical costs, state initiatives in developing alternative delivery
and reimbursement systems serve a useful purpose.II. Medicaid: The Program
Medicaid is a jointly funded federal!state~program that provides health
care to speci-fic categories of poor people. Itbecame law in 1965 as part of
the Social Security Act. The federal share varies inversely with state per
capita income and in 1989 ranged from 50 to 80 percent. Within federal
guidelines, each state administers its own program and has considerable
discretion in determining eligibility criteria, the. amount and scope of the
services provided, and the rates and methods of reimbursement. Accordingly,
Medicaid coverage of the indigent population and expenditures per recipient
vary considerably from state to state.
Eliqibilitv
The original federal guidelines required states to provide-Medicaid
coverage to poor children and their: mothers (recipients of~Aid to Families
with Dependent Children, AFDC) and to poor aged~ b~ind, and disabled
individuals (now generally recipients of Supplemental Security Income, SSl).
These groups are known as "categorically needy." Gradually, federal
requiremen~ts have extended Medicaid coverage to related groups. Most
recently, for example, the new federal budget package requires a gradual
extension of Medicaid coverage to all children under 19 in families with
incomes below the federal poverty level.3 In addition, the States.may choose
to provide Medicaid coverage, with federai ~upport, to others who are ,part of
the same "categorically needy" groups but who have somewhat higher incomes.4
3 In FY1989, states were required to provide Medicaid services to poor
children under six. The age limit will rise by one year annually for 13
years.
4 One such group includes pregnant women and infants to age one whose
family income falls below 185 percent of the federal poverty level.The states also have the option of providing Medicaid coverage to
"medically needy" people. Under this option, individuals may "spend down" to
meet Medicaid eligibility criteria. They "spend down" by incurring medical or
remedial care expenses that reduce their remaining income and liquid assets to
a level below that allowed by their state’s program.
As a result of these federal guidelines, childless adults (under age 65)
who are not disabled are not eligible for Medicaid no matter how low their
income or how high their medical expenses. In addition, because states can
and do set their eligibility requirements below the federal poverty level (in
1989, $9,890 per year for a family of three in the 48 contiguous states), many
poor families do not qualify for Medicaid. In 1989, Medicaid coverage of the
categorically needy (generally AFDC and SSI recipients) amounted to just over
one-half of the poverty-level population. Including people impoverished by
medical expenses and covered by current medically needy programs (in the
numerator but not in the denominator) brings the share to 65 percent,s
Because the states have a good deal of discretion in setting eligibility
requirements, the share of the state’s poverty population covered by its
categorically needy program ranged from over 100 percent in Missouri to 27
percent in Idaho. (Table A-2 provides these ratios for all of the states.)
In general, as Map 2 indicates, the highest ratios are clustered in the
Northeast and upper Midwest; the lowest are found scattered through the Plains
and Mountain states. These ratios reflect political decisions, and as Map 2
suggests, political choices concerning poverty programs have varied
s These ratios overstate the share of the poor receiving Medicaid ~for
yet another reason; that is, the poverty population refers to non-
institutionalized people, while 7 percent of Medicaid recipients in FY1989
were (at least temporarily) institutionalized.
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differences, some high-income states with relatively broad Medicaid coverage
receive more in federal matching funds for their state Medicaid program than
their residents contribute, through federal tax payments, to federal support
for Medicaid; in other words, the variation in state programs results in a
transfer of funds frem some comparatively poor to some wealthy states.
Dual Focus
By default, not by design, Medicaid has developed a split personality.
It provides--as intended--acute/preventive care to specific categories of the
vulnerable poor. It has also become the nation’s primary long-term care
program for people who fit the Medicaid categories, some of whom become
impoverished by paying privately for long-term (generally nursing home) care.
Although not its original focus, long-term care has grown as a share of
Medicaid expenditures and in 1989 accounted for over 40 percent of Medicaid
payments--made on behalf of less than 7 percent of the recipients.~ While
most long-term care recipients are elderly, the mentally retarded represent
another important and very expensive group. In 1989 residents of institutions
for the mentaTly retarded accounted for less than I percent of all Medicaid
recipients but for 12 percent of Medicaid payments.
Medicaid became the nation’s primary long-tern care program because
Medicare, the nationwide health insurance program fo~ the aged and certain
disabled, provides very limited coverage for long-term care. Legislators have
6 In this paper, data on "long-term care" refer to services provided by
skilled nursing facilities and intermediate care facilities (for the mentally
retarded and other). A small share of these services actually representS
convalescent rather than long-term care. However, a fraction of "home health"
services, which are not included in the long-term care data, also constitute
long-term care.
11feared that including long-tern care coverag~ within Medicare would overburden
the already strained resources of the Medicare program. Accordingly, while
Medicare paid 2 percent of nursing home care in 1988, Medicaid paid 44
percent.7
The compl~xions of the two programs differ significantly. Medicare is a
social insurance program to which people contribute while they are. working and
from which they are entitled to draw earned benefits as the need arises. By
contrast, Medicaid is stigmatized as a welfare program for the not-always-
deserving poor. It can be painful, thus, for the middle-class elderly to be
faced with huge nursing home costs, often exceeding $30,000 a year, and then
be forced to turn to Medicaid, after..exhausting the accumulated assets of a
lifetime.
III. National Trends: Why Medicaid Is a Growing Problem for State Governments
According to a widely held view, Medicaid spending is largely driven by
changing demographics and a growing need for long-term care for the aged. The
elderly account for a growing share of the population, the argument goes. And
the elderly are very expensive Medicaid recipients, in part because they are
important consumers of long-term care. Because Medicaid is the provider of
last resort for long-term care, a large share of this burden falls to the
states.
Demoqraphics
The pieces of this argument are all valid, but the conclusion is not.
The elderly do indeed represent a growing share of the population. And the
7 Out-of-pocket private pay covered 48~percent and private insurance a
mere I percent. The balance was covered by the Veterans Administration and
state and local government public health expenditures~
12share of the oldest old (individuals 85 and over, and the. group most likely to
need long-term care) is rising even faster. In the last 25 years, the U.S.
population grew by about one-third, the elderly population nearly doubled and
the oldest old tripled. These trends are projected to continue. The oldest
old accounted for 1 percent of the population in 1980; they are expected to
account for almost 2 percent in the year 2000 and for 5 percent by 2050.
Recent research indicates that one out of four people who reach their eighties
is likely to develop Alzheimer’s disease or some other form of dementia.
Victims of dementia often become unable to care for their physical needs and
eventually need round-the-clock supervision.
As the popular view maintains, the elderly are also relatively expensive
Medicaid beneficiaries. Medicaid payments per aged recipient equaled $5,900
in 1989 compared to $2,300 for the average recipient, in large part because of
the elderly’s need for nursing home care. Although much elder care is
provided informally on an unpaid basis and although private individuals pay
out-of-pocket for half of all nursing home care, Medicaid provides 90 percent
of the long-term care financed by government. Accordingly, while state (and
local) governments accounted for 10 percent of all personal health care
expenditures, they paid for 20 percent of nursing home care in FY1988. In
other words, the growing need for nursing home care pTaces a disproportionate
burden on the states.
Nevertheless, from 1975 to 1989 the rapid aging of the population was
not the driving force behind Medicaid’s expansion, and the growing need for
long-term care contributed only modestly. As Table I shows, the aged actually
declined as a share of all recipients between 1975 and 1989, and payments to
the aged fell (although less than proportionately) as a share of total
13Table 1
Share of Medicaid Recipients and Payments, by Category, FY1975 and FY1989
Percent
Category
United States                              California
Recipients Payments Recipients Payments
1975       1989       1975      1989        1975       1989    1975      1989
Aged: 16,4 13.3 35,6 34.1 19.1 12,6 26,6 22,8
Categorically neeQy 13.5 9,5 21.4 18,7 18,4 8.9 24,8 7,5 Medically needy 3,0 3,1 14.2 13.6 .6 3,7 1,8 15,3
Other~ ,7 1,8 ,0 ,0
Disabled: I0.7 14,8 24.9 37,6 14,4 15.1 29,4 39,6
Categorically needy 9,3 13.1 19.6 29,1 14.1 13,7 28.0 30,0 Med~cally needy 1,4 1.5 5,4 7,6 .3 1,4 1.5 9,6
Othera .3 ,9 ,0 ,0
Blind: .5 .4 .8 .8 .7 .7 1.2 1.3 Categorically needy .4 .3 .6 .6 .7 .7 1.1 1.2 Medically needy .1 .0 .2 .1 .0 .0 .0 .1 Other~ .1 .1 .0 .0
AFDC Child: 43.6 43,8 17.9 12,6 41.1 41,4 19.3 14,9
Categorically needy 39.8 38,1 15,6 10,3 37.6 31,5 17.3 9,3 Medically neeay 3.8 4,4 2,2 1,7 3.5 9,9 2,0 5,6
Othera 1,3 .6 ,0 ,0
AFDC Adult: 20,6 24,3 16,8 12,7 20,8 27.2 20,6 19,2 Categorically needy 18,9 20.2 15,7 10.4 18,4 21.2. 17,5 14,3
Medically needy 1,7 2,8 1.1 1,4 2,4 6,0 3,1 -5,0
Othera 1.2 ,8 .0 ,0
Otherb 8.2 3.4 4.0 2.3 3.9 2,9 3,0 2,2
All Nursing Facilities 6.3 6.8 38,4 40.7 4,3 3,7 23.2 27,1
ICF/Mental ly Retarded~ ,3 .6 3,1 12.2 ,0 ,3 ,0 6.8
All Other 6,0 6,2 35,3 28,5 4,3 3,4 23.2 20,3
" roups provided coverage by pre-1988 and 1988 legislation.
bIncludes other Title XIX, basis of eligibility unknown and, in some cases, adjustments for double
counting, cICF = Intermediate Care Facilities.
Source: U.S. Health Care Financing Administration, State Medicaid Data Tables for FY1975 and FY1989,
June 21, 1990. Based on data from HCFA form 2082.payments over this period. While payments for nursing home care rose slightly
in comparison to the total, the growth of payments to intermediate care
facilities for the mentally retarded more than accounted for this change.
California, the state with the largest number of Medicaid recipients and the
second highest Medicaid expenditures, shows much the same picture: the
elderly declined as a share of recipients and payments, while expenditures for
nursing homes took a larger share of the total only because payments for
facilities for the mentally retarded rose exceptionally fast. (Table A-3
provides comparable data for the five other states with the largest Medicaid
expenditures in FY1989: New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and
Texas. Although their experiences were far from uniform, they generally
corresponded with national trends.B)
What explains this surprising outcome, given ~he demographic trends?
Part of the explanation is that Social Security and private pensions have
reduced poverty among the elderly.9 In 1967 29.5 percent of the aged lived
in poverty. In 1988 the comparable figure was 12.0 percent. Accordingly, a
smaller proportion of the elderly now qualify for SSI and, thus, for Medicaid.
Indeed, the absolute number of aged Medicaid recipients has actually declined
since 1975. In addition, while the medically needy aged remained a constant
share of total Medicaid recipients, many of the medically needy aged have
8 New York is a clear exception. There aged recipients and payments for
the aged both grew as a share of their respective totals. Explanations for
New York state trends may include its relatively generous eligibility criteria
for the medically neeay aged, its high nursing home reimbursement rates (the
second highest in the nation after those In New Hampshire) and, possibly, its
rapidly expanding program of home health care (Kolbert 1991).
In addition, individuals who originally qualify for Medicaid as
disabled retain that designatio~ after they become aged. Accordingly, in
18 percent of blind and disabled Medicaid recipients were also aged 65 and
over.
1990
15Medicare coverage for a large share of their acute care needs and pay for part
of their nursing home expenses out of current Social Security and private
pension income. Support from these other sources helped to hold the growth of
Medicaid payments per medically needy aged recipient to a below-average pace
over this period. (By contrast, payments per categorically needy aged
recipient grew at an above-average pace from 1975 to 1989.) In other words,
while the aging of the U.S. population has undoubtedly contributed to raising
U.S. health care costs, Social Security and Medicare have helped to shield
Medicaid from the full impact of these trends.
In addition, the growth in payments for the elderly was heavily over-
shadowed by a huge increase in expenditures for the disabled. As Table I
shows, the disabled greatly increased as a share of the recipient pool and, in
particular, as a share of total Medicaid payments during the 1975-89 period.
As the memo item in Table I indicates, much of the increase in the share of
expenditures devoted to the disabled reflects the jump in payments to
intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded (ICF/MRs), already
mentioned. This surge followed 1972 legislation extending Medicaid coverage
to services provided by ICF/MRs that meet federal standards. Medicaid
coverage for the mentally retarded is almost completely limited to these
(usually large) special purpose residential institutions. Accordingly, state
governments encouraged their ICF/MRs to upgrade to me~t federal standards. As
they did so, the number of residents who thereby qualified for Medicaid
coverage more than d0ubled--despite a widespread exodus from these facilities
over this period.
Because press and congressional inquiries uncovered abuse and neglect in
some of the big state institutions in the early 1960s and because experience
16increasingly Showed that many mentally retarded people could lead semi-
independent lives if they had support services in the community, a declining
share of the mentally retarded population remained institutionalized.
However, those that remained tended to be the most profoundly retarded, those
with multiple disabilities, or those who were "medically fragile." In
addition, rising expectations about what mentally retarded children could
accomplish with special training and support spilled over into demands for
better services within the ICF!MRs as well. Accordingly, the average Medicaid
payment per ICF/MR resident rose almost 16 percent a year over this period to
reach $45,000 in 1989. These big increases in payments for the institution-
alized mentally retarded led to well-above-average increases in payments per
disabled recipient.
More recent legislative and administrative changes have also expanded
the disabled caseload. For example, in 1986 and 1987, the U.S. Congress
provided Medicaid coverage for individuals with no permanent address and then
required states to make an effort to ensure that homeless Medicaid
beneficiaries received Medicaid identity cards. Partly as a result, the
number of disabled Medicaid recipients rose 19 percent between 1985 and 1989.
Most observers estimate that a majority of the homeless are mentally ill; yet,
although one-quarter of the individuals receiving SSI disability are mentally
ill, only 12 percent of the mentally ill who would be eligible for SSI, and
thus Medicaid, actually receive benefits.I° In other words, the scope for
expanding coverage appears significant.
io In general, these benefits would focus on acute care since Medicaid
does not cover services in mental institutions for people ages 211 to 65.
17Finally, the AIDS epidemic has contributed to the increased share of
Medicaid expenditures absorbed by the disabled. Between 1981, when the first
U.S. AIDS case was recorded, and 1989, payments for AIDS patients rose to an
estimated 2 percent of the Medicaid total. Annual medica7 expenses for an
AIDS patient typically range from $25,000 to $35~000; however, Medicaid
frequently does not pay for the entire cost of the illness because many AIDS
patients pay for part of their medical expenses privately--through insurance
or out of pocket-~until they meet medically needy eligibility standards.
Data for 1985 to 1989 undoubtedly provide better clues about future
trends than do figures for the last 15 years. These more recent data suggest,
first, that the effect of the 1972 legislation permitting Medicaid payments to
residents of ICF/MRs has run its course. The number of recipients in ICF/MRs
bareTy rose between 1985 and 1989, and payments per recipient climbed at a
greatly reduced (but still above-average) pace.
In addition, the small absolute decline in the number of elderly
Medicaid recipients that was evident between 1975 and 1985 has continued
almost unabated. Seemingly, thus, the fall in poverty due to the Social
Security program is still outweighing demographic trends. Whether the elderly
will e~er emerge as the driving force behind growing Medicaid expenditures
remains to be seen. Washington may respond to growing demands for increased
Medicaid coverage for c~mmunit~ services for the mentally retarded and the
mentally ill, for example, by mandating program expansions that will again
swamp the impact of the aging population. In addition, one (probably overly)
pessimistic scenario suggests that AIDS patients may account for 13 percent of
Medicaid payments by the early 1990s (Congressional Research Service 1988, p.
489).
18These conclusions do not e7iminate the ~eed to develop a national
consensus on how to pay for long-term care, however. State governments are
already having a hard time financing their existing Medicaid obligations--
even before the impact of ongoing demographic change kicks in. The success of
Social Security and private pensions in maintaining the income of retired
citizens may just have postponed the inevitable.
Finding an alternative solution to the long-term care problem would lift
a big burden from the states. (See the box for a brief discussion of the
.social insurance approach to long-term care.) Depending on the groups and
services covered, removing long-term care from Medicaid would transfer 30 to
45 percent of the states’ Medicaid costs. A solution covering current
services for the elderly (including currently very limited home health care)
would remove one-third of the states’ expenditures. A solution that ~included
the mentally retarded would eliminate 45 percent of the states’ outlays. Of
course, shifting burdens does not_ eliminate costs. In the end, individuals
will pay for long-term care--through higher taxes if the government pays
directly, through lower wages and dividends and higher prices if the
government subsidizes employment-related fringe benefits, or (very largely) in
out-of-pocket expenditures and unpaid labor if the current arrangement goes
unchanged. The costs are there. One way or another, society will pay.
Risinq Health Care. Costs Drive Medicaid Spendinq
Even if the long-term-care half of the Medicaid program could be spun
off to a social insurance program or to private insurance markets--and neither
development is likely over the near term--the states would still be left
facing mini budget-busters whose costs are rising more than twice as fast as
state revenues. In fact, a key point is that soaring medical costs have been
~9A Social Insurance Program for Long-Term Care
One frequently mentioned approach to paying for long-term care
involves e~tablishing a broad-based social Insurance program (like
Social Security and Medicare) to which most citizens contribute and from
which they can draw, as a matter of right, in case of need. Many
analysts have written on the need for such a social insurance program,
and the reader is referred to a selection of their works listed in the
bibliography. These writers have pointed out that the problem of
providing long-term care is frequently a family problem spanning the
generations, not an aged problem pitting young against old. They have
emphasized how much of the current weight is carried byunpaid family
members. This "solution" may be satisfactory from a state or federal
budgetary perspective, but it exacts a price in terms of the health and
productivity of current workers, particularly working women.
Solving the long-term care problem is beyond the scope of this
study, especially since little consensus concerning the solution’s basic
outline has yet developed. Although recent Administrations have looked
to private insurance markets to provide coverage for the risk of long-
term care, many observers fear these markets may not prove adequate to
the entire task. While a role for privat~ insurance surely exists, the
likelihood of underinsurance and risk aversion, discussed above,
suggests that government intervention may be required. Because young
workers underestimate their need for long-term care and because adverse
selection among older workers becomes a problem, private policies are,
and are likely to remain, limited and expensive.
One possible approach would extend Medicare to cover a basic
package of long-term care with private Medigap policies covering
deductibles, co-payments, and frills. Such a program could be funded by
a payroll tax or from general revenues. The basic package could include
elder day care, home care, and respite care--not with the expectation of
saving money but to avoid a bias toward institutionalization. Indeed,
the logistics of delivery and quality control appear to make home care
programs more expensive than nursing home care for comparably
incapacitated people. Moreover, since the demand for home care might
soar if third-party payment were available, a long-term care program
should probably require rigorous case management or significant co-
payments for use of home care benefits (Ball and Bethel 1989).11
11 Until recently, states had to apply for waivers to offer Medicaid
coverage for home care. The October 1990 federal budget package gave states
the option of providing Medicaid coverage of home care for frail or immobile
elderly citizens. Federal contributions are capped at $580 million over a
five-year period (Baco~ 1990).
2Othe major force driving Medicaid expenditures over the last 15 years. Total
Medicaid payments more than quadrupled over this period. The total number of
Medicaid recipients grew less than 7 percent. A shift in the composition of
the recipient pool--from AFDC child to AFDC adult and from aged to disabled,
for instance--contributed very little. Thus, more than 90 percent of the
growth in Medicaid expenditures reflects the rising cost of U.S. medical care.
Indeed, per capita personal health care expenditures actually rose faster than
per recipient Medicaid costs over the last decade.12
Since 1975 U.S. personal health care expenditures have grown at a 12
percent annual average pace. According to a Health Care Financing
Administration breakdown, this increase in personal health care expenditures
has three components. Population growth accounted for roughly 10 percent,
while the remaining 90 percent, the "costs," can be broken into two parts:
price increases explain 60 percent and changes in "intensity" account for 30
percent of the growth in personal health care expenditures over this period.
"Intensity" refers to the number or kind of services used; hospital costs
provide an example of its impact. Hospital costs per inpatient day rose 13
percent a year between 1980 and 1986, in part because the number of diagnostic
tests, like ultrasound and CAT scans, rose more than 75 percent on a per
capita basis over this period. Moreover, although Social Security and
Medicare have kept the aging of the population from driving total Medicaid
expenditures, changing demographics have undoubtedly increased the intensity
with which all U.S. medical care is used.
I~ According to estimates made by Lewin/ICF (and published in Families
USA Foundation 1990) per capita personal health care expenditures grew 139
percent between 1980 and 1990. During the same period (FY1980 to FY1989) per
recipient Medicaid payments rose 115 percent.
21Although state governments have been very inventive in trying to devise
ways to curb rising medical costs, they have limited ability to stem this tide
either together or, more particularly, on their own. State and local
governments account for only 10 percent of personal health care expenditures
(excluding insurance premiums and administrative expenses). Accordingly,
individual state governments have limited market power. To make matters
worse, if states try to set Medicaid reimbursement schedules below the going
"market" rates, Medicaid recipients will have problems gaining access to care,
as the whole history of the program demonstrates.
IV. State Medicaid Payments Per Capita
Although many national trends, such as soaring health care costs,
changing federal mandates, and the aging of the population, affect Medicaid
costs in all of the states, Medicaid payments per capita and per $1,000 of
personal income vary considerably from one state to another. Table 2 displays
these data for the 49 states with a Medicaid program in FY1989. As the table
shows, Medicaid payments per capita ranged from highs of $568 in New York and
$405 in Massachusetts to lows of $116 in Wyoming and $95 in Nevada. On the
basis of Medicaid payments per $1,000 of personal income, New York and Rhode
Island ranked highest with payments of $26.94 and $20.90 respectively, while
Nevada and Virginia were at the bottom of the list at $4.91 and $7.12.
Recipients per Capita
Decomposing payments per capita into two parts, ]) recipients per capita
and 2) payments per recipient, helps to explain the variation. To start with
the first relationship, the share of Medicaid recipients in a state’s
population reflects variations in the incidence of poverty and in the share of
22Table 2






Total Medicaid per $1,000
Payments Payments of Personal
(Millions) Per Capita Income
$54,110     $221.69 $12.59
Alabama 509 123.59 9.07
Alaska 124 235.68 10.89
Arkansas 491 204.16 15.83
California 5,498 189.18 9.49
C~lorado 452 136.34 7.7-7
Connecticut 1,027 317.02 12.85
Delaware 110 163.84 8.87
Florida 1,912 150.89 8.55
Georgia 1,226 190.50 11.87
Hawaii 159 143.29 7.76
Idaho 134 132.53 9.67
Illinois 2,103 180.42 9.58
Indiana 1,157 206.79 13.11
Iowa 522 183.92 11.88
Kansas 380 151.23 9.17
Kentucky 810 217.28 15.81
Louisiana 1,036 236.38 18.30
Maine 371 303.98 18.70
Maryland 936 199.47 9.49
Massachusetts 2,393 404.71 18.25
Michigan 1,954 210.74 12.08
Minnesota 1,105 253.88 14.01
Mississippi 474 180.96 15.43
Missouri- 781 151.42 9.29
Montana 155 192.05 13.65
Nebraska 256 159.02 10.29
Nevada 105 94.59 4.91
New Hampshire 183 165.35 8.16
New Jersey 1,920 248.21 10.44
New Mexico 235 153.55 11.68
New York 10,191 567.75 26.94
North Carolina 1,165 177.23 11.66
North Dakota 178 270.09 19.91
Ohio 2,666 244.42 14.93
Oklahoma 635 196.84 13.91
Oregon 409 144.95 9.11
Pennsylvania 2,458 204.16 11.82
Rhode Island 374 375.18 20.90
South Carolina 556 158.23 11.61
South Dakota 143 200.00 14.62
Tennessee 972 196.74 13.39
Texas 2,226 130.99 8.34
Utah 201 117.91 9.02
Vermont 133 234.50 14.32
Virginia 822 134.75 7.12
Washington 962 202.13 11.45
West Virginia 324 174.53 14.14
Wisconsin 1,119 229.99 13.98
Wyoming 55 115.91 8.00
"ExcIL~Jing the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
Note: Arizona does not participate in Medicaid; it has an alternative
demonstration program.
Source: U.S. Health Care Financing Administration, State Medicaid Data
Tables for FY 1989. U.S. Bureau of the Census, and U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis. Population as of July I, 1989; per~onal income for
calendar year 1989.Table 3
"Explaining" the Ratio of State to U.S. Recipients per Capita, FY1989
Actual
Jurisdiction (I)
Ratio of .State to U.S Medicaid Recipients per Capita
Hypothetical, if State = U.S. except for:
Categorically Poverty Pop./































New Hampshire .36 .83
New Jersey .74 1.20
New Mexico .80 .67
New York 1.35 1.03
North Carolina .80 .82





Rhode Island 1.12 1.35
South Carolina .85 .80







West Virginia 1.37 .93
Wisconsin 1.03 1.29
~Jyoming .82 1.05
Medically Needy Aged Pop./ Other Med. Needy/
Aged/Aged Pop. Total Pop. Total Pop.
(4) (5) (6)
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1.47 .97 1.00 .91
.77 .97 .98 .91
1.53 .97 1.01 .98
.96 1.02 1.00 1.13
.80 .97 .99 .91
.57 1.05 1.00 1.01
.83 .97 1.00 .91
1.33 1.03 1.00 1.00
.96 .97 1.01 .94
1.10 .97 .99 .93
.74 1.04 .99 1.04
1.15 .97 1.00 .91
1.06 1.02 1.00 1.02
.89 .97 1.00 .91
1.16 .99 1.01 .95
.82 1.01 1.00 .98
1.28 1.02 1.00 1.14
1.43 .97 1.00 .94
.82 .97 1.00 .94
.66 1.03 1.00 .99
.67 1.06 1.00 1.10
1.03 1.03 1.00 1.09
.84 1.05 1.00 1.01
1.73 .97 1.00 .91
1.02 .97 1.00 .91
1.14 1.01 1.00 .94
1.04 .98 1.00 .92
.90 .97 1.00 .91
.47 1.00 1.00 .95
.72 ~97 1.00 .91
1.42 .97 .99 .91
1.08 1.07 1.00 1.16
1.00 1.03 1.00 .96
1.06 1.06 1.00 1.06
.90 .97 1.00 .91
1.09 .97 I~00 .95
.91 .97 1.00 .96
.90 .98 1.01 1.01
.82 1.05 1.01 .95
1.23 .97 1.00 .91
1.14 .97 1.00 .91
1.24 .98 1.00 1.04
1.14 .97 .99 .93
.87 .97 .99 .93
.76 1.02 1.00 .94
.79 1.01 1.00 .93
.86 .99 1.00 .98
1.55 .97 1.00 .95
.86 .98 1.00 .94
.89 .97 .99 .91
Medicaid recipients per capita was calculated according to the following equation:
Medicaid Recipients = Cat. Neecbf x Pov. Pop. + Med. Needy Aged x ~ + Other Med. Needy
Total Population      Pov. Pop. Tot. Pop.       Aged Pop.       Tot. Pop.       Total Pop.
= RC
The actual ratio of state to U.S. Medicaid recipients per capita equals RC~T/ RC~. The hypothetical ratios were calculated RC~ /
RC~ except that one variable at a time took on the state rather than the U.S. value.
Note: Medicaic recipients from Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have been removed from U.S. totals, and the populatio~ of Arizona
has been removed fro~ the U.S. total population. In addition recipients covered as a result
of pre 1988 .or 1988 legislation or whose status is "unknown" or "other" have been added to categorically neecfy in both state an~
national totals.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1990; U.S. Health Care Financing Aci~inistration, "A
Statistical Report on Medicaid: State Medicaid Programs" (HCFA 2082), June 1990; University of Wisconsin - Madison, Institute for
Research on Poverty, Focus, vol. 1l (Fall 1988).elderly in the population as well as differences in the eligibility standards
the state imposes.
Table 3 shows the results of an experiment in which eachstate was
assumed to have national demographic characteristics and eligibility criteria.
Using the equation shown at the bottom of the table, the experiment involved
changing each variable, one at a time, from the national average to the
state’s own value and then comparing the resulting hypothetical number of
state Medicaid recipients per capita to the U.S. average. If the variable in
question makes little contribution to explaining why the state has more (or
fewer) Medicaid recipients per capita than the nation, the ratio remains close
to 1.0.
For example, the two states with the highest Medicaid payments per
capita in FY1989 were New York and Massachusetts. In New York the share of
Medicaid recipients in the population was well (35 percent) above average (as
shown in column 1) because slightly generous eligibility criteria for the
categorically needy (column 2) were reinforced by an above-average share of
the population living in poverty (column 3) plus relatively inclusive
eligibility criteria for the medically needy program (columns 4 and 6). By
contrast, in Massachusetts the number of Medicaid recipients per capita was
only 6 percent above the national average because relatively inclusive
eligibility criteria for the categorically and medically needy programs
(columns 2, 4, and 6) were partially offset by the relatively Small share of
the state’s population living in poverty (column 3).
States with the highest ratios of Medicaid recipients per capita include
Michigan, Missouri and Mississippi. In the first two states, generous
categorically needy criteria are reinforced by slightly abQve-average levels
25of poverty -- although Michigan has an inclusive medically needy program while
Missouri does not. In Mississippi slightly broad coverage in the
categorically neeay program plus the highest incidence of poverty in the
nation produce a well-above average Medicaid caseload -- despite the lack of a
medically needy program.
Variations in the share of the population over age 65 make a noticeable
~ifference in relatively few states. Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Florida,
Arkansas and lowa experience higher Medicaid caseloads because they have
above-average shares of elderly residents; several Southwestern, Western and
Mountain states benefit from their relatively young populations.
Nevertheless, because the elderly are more costly than AFDC recipients
and because the medically needy tend to be considerably more expensive than
categorically needy beneficiaries, even a slightly above-average share of aged
or medically needy recipients translates into substantially higher payments
per capita. Accordingly, analysts in states facing budget crises often
advocate tightening eligibility requirements either for the medically needy or
across the board to bring then in line with the national average. One
drawback to this approach, however, is that states often find that tightening
eligibility requirements during a cyclical downturn is counterproductive
because they lose the federal matching grant (recorded on the revenue side of
the budget) but still wind up paying for much of the medical care for the
excluded individuals through state-financed programs.
Payments per Recipient
Table 4 ranks the states according to the second crucial ratio--payments
per Medicaid recipient, shown here in relatio~ to the U.S. average. As column
1 indicates, Medicaid payments per recipient were roughly double the national
26Table 4
Medicaid Payments per Recipient an~ Personal Health Care Expenditures per Capita
in Relation to the U.S. Average, FY1989







Medicaid Payments per Standardized Recipienta
Categorically      Personal
Categorically & Medically Care
Needy Needy~ per Capita
U.S. Average 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
New Hamgshire 2.19 1.98 1.34 .82
New York 1.95 1.60 1.48 1.16
Connecticut 1.94 1.58 1.30 1.11
Massachusetts 1.7-/ 1.19 1.19 1.25
North Dakota 1.65 1.60 1.45 1.10
Indiana 1.60 1.75 .91
Rhode Island 1.57 1.50 1.13 1.12
New Jersey 1.55 1.81 1.29 .92
Minnesota 1.48 1.92 1.59 1.02
Alaska 1.48 2.19 .94
South Dakota 1.39 .97 .96
Maine 1.31 1.36 .92 .90
Maryland 1.26 1.08 1.32 1.00
Delaware 1.24 1.38 .94
Idaho 1.24 1.33 .68 .71
Wisconsin 1.20 1.13 .78 1.01
Nevada 1.10 1.16 1.14
Montana 1.09 1.23 1.04 .85
Oklahoma 1.08 1.14 .85 .88
Vermont 1.07 1.08 .93 .81
North Carolina 1.03 1.11 1.26 .76
Virginia 1.03 .91 .98 .86
Co[orado 1.02 1.11 1.00
Nebraska~ 1.02 1.22 .94 1.01
Ohio 1.01 1.40 1.03
Iowa 1.00 1.26 .92 .97
Washington .97 1.21 .86 .95
Pennsylvania .96 1.08 .92 1.05
Florida .94 .78 .68 1.00
Kansas .93 1.03 .98 1.05
Utah .92 1.37 1.03 .74
Georgia .91 .94 .85
New Mexico .89 .80 .74
Arkansas .88 .80 .70 .80
Illinois .87 .89 .77 1.08
South Carolina .87 .60 .70
Louisiana .85 .97 .84 .90
Missouri .83 .89 1.06
Oregon .83 .75 .56 .95
Kentucky .81 .67 .70 .77
Texas .81 .93 .90
Tennessee .77 .85 .72 .93
Wyoming .77 .88 .72
Michigan .75 .72 .66 1.06
Hawaii .74 .54 .48 1.02
California .71 .66 .68 1.19
Alabama .68 .61 .94
West Virginia .58 .68 .61 .86
Mississippi .50 .56 .72
~Assuming each state had the same mix of Medicaid recipients as the nation but
paid state costs.
bOnly calculated for states with a medically needy program.
Source: HCFA State Medicaid Data Disk for FY19891 Families USA, Lewin/ICF estimates.
27average in New Hampshire, New York, and Connecticut. Nevertheless, it is
important to look at the composition of the recipient population because
medical care for an AFDC child costs much less than medical care for an
elderly or disabled nursing home resident.
As one might expect, payments per recipient rise by category from AFDC
child to AFDC adult, to aged individual, to the blind and disabled, as Table 5
shows. In addition, payments to a medically needy recipient generally exceed
those to a categorically needy person in each category. Accordingly, judging
how out of line a state’s payments per recipient really are requires
calculating what the state’s average payment would have been if the state had
the same recipient mix as the nation but paid state cos~.s.
The results of these "standardizing" calculations are shown in Columns 2
and 3 of Table 4 -- again in relation to the U.S. average. Column 2.presents
figures for a standard categorically needy recipient for all states. Column 3
shows standardized data for all recipients for those states with a medically
needy program. Comparing the values in columns I and 3 indicates that 75
percent of the difference between Massachusetts and U.S. payments per
recipient reflects composition,13 while in New York recipient mix accounts
for 50 percent of the difference.14 In other words, these states have a very
expensive mix of Medicaid beneficiaries, with above-average shares of the
aged, the disabled, and the medically neeay.
After standardizing the recipient pool, Minnesota and New York had the
highest Medicaid payments per recipient among the states with a medically
[(77 19)/77] : ,75
[(95 - 48)/95] = .49
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Source: U.S. Health Care Financing Administration,
State Medicaid Data Tables for FY1989, June 21, 1990.
Based on data from HCFA form 2082.needy program. Minnesota payments per beneficiary were 59 percent above the
national average in 1989, while New York’s were 48 percent above average.
This remaining difference in costs per standardized recipient reflects
both price and intensity of use. Differences in intensity include, for
example, the fact that the Minnesota and New York Medicaid programs cover
services that other states do not. For example, while they and 33 other
states offered a medically needy program in 1989, nine states with a medically
needy program provided no coverage of nursing home care for the elderly either
because their medically needy program did not include the aged, or their
medically needy program for the aged did not provide nursing home services.Is
In addition, states vary in the number of optional services they choose to
provide and whether they will provide them for all~recipients or just for the
categorically needy. In 1987 Massachusetts16 and Minnesota offered to all
beneficiaries 31 and 30 out of 32 services permitted but not required by the
federal government. By contrast, Wyoming offered eight optional services to
the categorically needy only. Co-payments and limits on frequency of use also
reduce intensity in some states. In other words, although this standardizing
exercise avoids comparing apples with oranges, it still compares Granny Smiths
with Macouns.
IS The distinction between states with and without medically needy
programs for the aged is blurred, however. Federal law permits states to
establish a special and fairly generous income level to be used only in
determining Medicaid eligibility for individuals living in nursing homes.
Although this federal provision makes no allowance for "spending down," all of
the states that have no medically needy program use this special option to
provide Medicaid coverage for nursing home residents, as will be discussed
further in the text below. On the other hand, some states with a medically
needy program limit the number of licensed nursing home beds as a device for
controlling Medicaid payments.
16 The press of its budget deficit has forced Massachusetts to eliminate
or curtail several optional services in FY1990 and FY1991.
3OState variations in personal health care costs also affect this
differential. For example, recently published data indicate that total health
care spending per capita is currently 16 percent above the national average in
New York--and the third highest in the nation (Lewin/ICF data published in
Families U.S.A. 1990). New York’s Medicaid payments per recipient will
reflect the relatively high cost Of personal health care in the state.
Otherwise, New York Medicaid recipients will be denied access to care or will
receive below-state-average quality of care. Of course, part of the cost
differential may also represent relative inefficiencies in the state’s
program. By contrast with New York, Minnesota personal health care costs were
very close to the national average; thus, that state’s high Medicaid costs per
recipient reflect a particularly high-quality Medicaid package (which, by
reputation, it is) or below-average efficiency or some combination of the two.
V. Options for Controlling Medicaid Costs
Currently, in more than 30 states policymakers face serious fiscal
problems and are under intense pressure to reduce the cost of their Medicaid
programs, What are their options? They can Shift costs from the public to
the private sector, and they can make the existing program more efficient.
From the perspective of society as a whole, shifting costs does not eliminate
them; reducing unnecessary care or administrative inefficiency does.
Unfortunately, the states’ current fiscal problems may force policymakers to
take a narrow view. Moreover, the suggested dichotomy is not complete, since
shifting costs may eliminate some unneeded care, and the mechanism for
reducing unneeded care may involve some cost shifts.
31The following section will discuss the most frequently mentioned options
for cutting state Medicaid spending according to this scheme; It will start
with those choices that rely on shifting costs by: I) eliminating optional
programs and services; and 2) tightening eligibility requirements. The
section will then explore approaches to increasing efficiency/reduc.ing waste
by: I) asking the cons~mem’to share the marginal cost;.2) reducing the return
to the provider; and 3) increasing the use of managed care, a mild form of
rationing.
Shiftinq Costs to the Private Sector
For states that have developed an unusually comprehensive Medicaid
~package, eliminating programs and services permitted but not required by the
federal government represents one policy option. The states that offer an
unusually broad Medicaid program are shown in Table 8 below~ The following
analysis will focus on four of them: New York and California, which have the
largest payments; and Massachusetts and Minnesota, which offered the largest
number of optional services in 1987.
Eliminatinq optional proqrams and services. HCFA data make it possible
to estimate the budgetary impact of most (but not all) of the Selected states’
optional programs and services. Column I of Table 6 lists the maximum short-
term spending cuts that these state governments could ostensibly achieve .by
eliminating,each of these programs and services. Because the medically needy
.may use optional services, the savings listed under options I and II cannot be
added together. Alt~hough eliminating both the medically needy program and the
optional services would result in larger, savings than either step taken alone,
the savings would be less than the sum of options I and II.
32Table 6
Estimated Impact of Eliminating Optional Medicaid Programs and Services in Selecte~ States, FY1989
State Benefits Eliminated
Gross Savings/ Savings/Net Net Savings/
Medicaid Payments Total Medicaid Federal Matching Total Spending of
Eliminated Payments Funds Lost State Resources
~$ millions) (Percent) ($ millions) (Percent)
(I) (2) (3) (4)
New York I. Medically Needy ProQram Only
Total                           5,394.1 52.9 2,697.1 11.0
Aged 3,145.1 30.9 1,572.6 6.4
Disabled and Blind 1,7-37.0 17.0 868.5 3.5
AFDC - Total" 443.2 4.3 221.6 .9
Other 68.8 .7 34.4 .I
If. Optional Services Only
Total 2,865.0 28.1 1,432.5 5.8
ICF/MRs 1,309.3 12.8 654.6 2.7
ICF/Other 389.7 3.8 194.9 .8
Dental Services B4.O .8 42.0 .2
Other Practitioners 59.2 .6 29.6 .I
Clinic Services 309.3 3.0 154.6 .6
Prescribed Drugs 402.0 3.9 201.0 .8
Other 311.5 3.1 155.8 .6
California I. Medically Needy Program Only
Total                           1,984.2 36.1 992.1 4.0
Aged 842.4 15.3 421.2 1.7
Disabled and Blind 536.1 9.8 268.0 1.1
AFDC - Total" 581.0 10.6 290.5 1.2
Other 24.7 .4 12.4 .I
If. Optional Services Only
Total 1,361.3 24.8 680.6 2.7
ICFiMRs 374.6 6.8 187.3 .8
ICF/Other 27.6 .5 13.8 .1
DentalServices .9 0 .4 0
Other Practitioners 63.4 1.2 31.7 .I
Clinic Services 171.7 3.1 85.8 .3
Prescribed Drugs 457.6 8.3 228.8 .9
Other 265.5 4.8 132.8 .5
I. Medically Need~ Program Only
Total                             1,286.0 53.7 643.0 6.6
Aged 841.8 35.2 420.9 4.3
Disabled and Blind 314.9 13.1 157.4 1.6
AFDC - Total= 55.3 2;3 27.6
Other 74.0 3.1 37.0 .4
If. Optional Services Only
Total 1,040.7 43.5 520.4 5.4
ICF/MRs 295.9 12.4 148.0 1.5
ICF/Other 427.2 17.9 213.6 2.2
Dental Services" 24.4 1.0 12.2 .I
Other Practitioners~ 20.3 .8 I0~2 .1
Clinic Services 79.4 3.3 39.7 .4
Prescribed Drugs~ 115.7 4.8 57.8 .6
Other 77.8 3.2 38.9 .4
Minnesota I. Medically Nee~y Program Only
Total                               429.1 38.8 201.4 4.5
Aged 273.9 24.8 128.5 2.9
Disab[ed and Blind 112.0 10.1 52.6 1.2
AFDC - Total" 10.4 .9 4.9 .I
Other 32.8 3.0 15.4
II. Optional Services Only
Total 466.5 42.2 218.9 4.9
ICF/MRs 214.4 19.4 100.6 2.3
ICF!Other 120.4 10.9 56.5 1.3
Dental Services 12.1 1.1 5.7 .1
Other Practitioners 11.1 1.0 5.2
Cl~nic Services 15.8 1.4 7.4
PrescribedDrugs 53.0 4.8 24.9                      .6
Other 39.7 3.6 18.6 .4
"If a state chooses to have a medically needy program, federal law requires that the program cover pregnant wo~en and children.
bRecent state legislation has placed some limits on Medicaid coverage Of these services.
Source: Author’s estimates based on data fro~ HCFA form 2082, and U.S. Bureau of the Census.
33As column 2 shows, a decision to terminate these optional benefits would
reduce these states’ Medicafd expenditures by a dramatic one-fourth to one-
half--on a gross basis. Column 3 records these savings net the resulting loss
of federal matching funds (with the federal share assumed to be 50 percent
across the board). Column 4 shows these net public sector savings as a share
of total state spending of state resources (t~tal direct spending less revenue
from the federal government).
As Table 6 indicates, the bulk of these public sector savings would
derive from eliminating the medically needy program or services provided by
intermediate care facilities. Accordingly, the cost of these public sector
savings would fall largely on the mentally retarded and on elderly individuals
impoverished by uninsured medical and long-term care expenses. These people
(and their families) would face all the costs shown in column 1--whether in
the form of out-of-pocket expenses or medical care forgone--while the state
would save the amount shown in column 3.
But what would be the impact of this cutback on other income support and
health care programs funded by these states? While some institutionalized
individuals could undoubtedly live with their families, what would be the cost
in terms of family members’ time, health, income, and thus, tax revenue? The
average resident of a long-t~rm care facility is a woman in her eighties with
three or four chronic illnesses. One-third are non-ambulatory. Nationally,
roughly one-half of all elderly long-term care residents have A~zheimer’s
disease or a related disorder (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1990, p. 84). And many
of these institutionalized individuals have no immediate family~ If a needy
individual is eliminated from Medicaid eligibility, where does the cost of his
care resurface?
34A significant portion would undoubtedly reappear within the Medicaid
program itself, since it seems unlikely that %hese states would choose to be
the only ones in the nation (among those without a medically needy program)
not using the "300-percent rule." Federal law permits states to establish a
special income level to be used only in determining Medicaid eligibility for
individuals living in nursing homes or in need of (currently very limited)
home and community-based services. This special income level is capped at 300
percent of the basic SSI payment level for an individual (3 X $386 or $1,158
per month in 1990); thus it is known as the "300-percent rule." All of the
states that have no medically needy program use this special option to provide
Medicaid coverage for nursing home residents. Over half of this group of
states use the maximum income level permitted. This income level is
sufficiently high to cover almost half of elderly men and.perhaps 80 percent
of elderly women (Neuschler 1988).
Table 7 presents data for the states without a medically needy program
covering nursing home care for the elderly. As a group, these states do not
succeed in eliminating the costs of caring for the elderly from their Medicaid
program. As the table shows, in these states without a medically needy
program for the aged, elderly Medicaid beneficiaries and beneficiaries
receiving nursing home services (other than in institutions for the mentally
retarded) represented a slightly above-average share of total recipients.
Payments for nursing homes were also above average as a share of total
payments, although total payments for the aged were somewhat below the
national average. These data suggest that not offering a medically needy
program for the aged would generally not eliminate the cost of providing long-
term care for the indigent aged from the state’s Medicaid program. By
35Table 7
States with No Medically Needy Program for the Aged, FY1989:
Aged and Nursing Facility Recipients and Payments as a Share of Total
Recipients and Payments
Percent
Aged as e Share of Total
Jurisdiction           Recipients          Payments          Recipients
ICF + SNF" as a Share o~ Total
Payments
Alabama 20.86 35.47 6.57 29.91
Alaska 7,87 22.16 3.09 25.19
CoLorado 18.79 33.41 11.00 31.53
Delaware 12.69 39.19 5.99 33.92
Georgia 16.69 29.11 6.82 24.57
Idaho 13.89 31.70 10,19 29.96
Indiana 14.05 31,92 14,33 36.24
Mississippi 14.17 31.38 4.19 26.09
M~ssouri 15.48 37.20 8.21 33.70
Nevada 16.37 28.84 6.61 27.02
New Mexico 11.42 25.61 5.24 25.51
Ohio 9.08 30.17 7.71 32.19
South Carolina 16.45 27.52 4.60 21.32
South Dakota 18.60 38.16 13.04 33.35
Texas 18.29 36.06 7.06 24.89
Wyoming 15.81 42.11 9.00 40.91
16 State Average        15.03 32.50 7.73 29.77
U.S. Average 13.32 34.05 6.17 28.50
"Intermediate care facilities
skilled nursing facilities.
(other than those for the mentally retarded) and
Source: HCFA State Medicaid Data Disk for FY 1989.
36contrast, such a step might succeed in shifting a part of the cost of
acute/preventive care for these individuals out of Medicaid. However, the
Medicaid provisions of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988
(provisions that were not later repealed) will soon limit the acute care
savings to be obtained by ending medically needy programs for the aged (or
disabled). These provisions require state Medicaid programs to pay Medicare
premiums, deductibles and co-insurance for aged and disabled individuals whose
income is below, the federal poverty level in January 1992.17 In other words,
these provisions extend Medicaid acute-care coverage to aged and disabled
individuals whose income falls between the SSI standard and the poverty line.
Where the cost of any acute/preventive care eliminated from Medicaid
coverage would reemerge is less obvious. It does seem clear, however, that
much of any increase in uncompensated care delivered would be covered by
higher charges to private patients and, eventually, by higher insurance
premiums. Some Costs would also spill over into parts of the budget not
directly related to health care. For example, the state of Massachusetts is
currently considering eliminating prenatal care during the first two
trimesters of pregnancy from Medicaid coverage. However, a U.S. Office of
Technology Assessment study has found that the medical costs of caring for the
additional low birthweight Children likely to be born under this policy would
more than offset the savings to the Medicaid program. In addition, because
low birthweight children are much more likely ~han normal birthweight children
to r~quire special education, the costs of eliminating coverage of early
17 And whose nonexempt resources are at or below twice the resource
standard used in the SSI program.
37prenatal care will also impinge on the state’s educati.on budget (Chaikind and
Corman 1990).
Another method of shifting the costs of specific benefits away from the
Medicaid program involves setting limits on the use of covered services (for
example, on the number of doctor’s visits permitted per year). The problem
with limits set by administrative fiat is that they are-not very flexible.
Accordingly, they may not be cost effective. For example, in the early 1980s
New Hampshire had set a limit on Medicaid-covered prescriptions at three per
month. As a result, according to a recent study, admissions to New Hampshire
nursing homes doubled; hospitalization rates also rose, but to a lesser
extent. Doctors admitted patiehts to these ]~s~itutions as a-~ay to obtain
required drugs, and because some individuals’ health actually deteriorated
(Winslow 1990). By contrast, the Massachu~etts 7egislature’s 1990 decision
to eliminate several optional services from program coverage incorporates some
flexibility; by exception, a doctor may certify that the service~ are
medically necessary, as might be the case, for instance, with podiatric
services for diabetics.
Oregon’s widely discussed effort to develop a hierarchy of Medicaid-
covered services based on cost/benefit criteria represents still another
experiment in setting administrative limits. The state’s first attempt at
ranking services resulted in such a bizarre list that it was sent back to the
drawing board. (For example, since duration of benefit was given a 50 percent
weight, orthodontics preceded treatment for meningitis.) The major problem
with setting limits by fiat will remain, however, regardless of how
"reasonable" the final list may be. Although the classifications of service
or diagnosis may be very detailed, medical cost./benefit will always depend on
38individual patient circumstances and require ihdividual judgment.
Accordingly, Oregon’s efforts to reduce waste, should they be implemented, are
likely to result in a good deal of cost shifting. (Incidentally, Medicaid
services for the elderly were originally expected to be exempt from this
cost/benefit analysis in Oregon’s plan. However, press discussion indicates
that they may be included in 1992.)
Tiqhteninq eliqibilitv criteria. Tightening eligibility criteria to
bring them close to national standards represents an alternative way of
shifting public sector costs to the private sector. (Again, the estimated
savings from tightening eligibility criteria and the estimated savings from
eliminating optional services are not additive; the policy choices overlap to
an unknown extent.) For example, New York and Massachusetts are two states
where medically needy Medicaid recipients represent an unusually large share
of the state’s elderly population. At current cost and benefit levels,
tightening eligibility requirements for the medically needy aged would cut New
York and Massachusetts’ Medicaid spending by 20 to 25 percent (gross); net the
loss of federal matching funds, such changes would save between 3 and 6
percent of these states’ own resources.
A less fiscally promising route to cutting state Medicaid expenditures
would involve reducing the share of the state’s impoverished population
covered by the categorically needy program to the national average level.
Moreover, such a step would require tightening eligibility for AFDC and SSI as
well, and in most states the AFDC standard of need ranges from just at to well
below the federal poverty level. In addition, new federal requirements
phasing in Medicaid payments for pregnant women, children, the elderly and the
disabled with incomes below the federal poverty level will soon limit the
39Table 8
Medicaid Payments per Actual and per Standardized Recipient and Personal Health Care Expenditures per Capita
in Relation to the U.S. Average, States with Relatively Comprehensive Programs," FY 1989
Medicaid Medicaid Personal Health Payments per Payments per Care Expenditures Actue[ Recipient Standardized Recipient Per Capita PCHRGb Jurisdiction Relative to US Avg. Relative to US Avg. Relative to US Avg. Rank
United States 1.00 1.00 1.00
No. of Services,
1987
I. Connecticut 1.94 1.30 1.11 5 24
Maine 1.31 0.92 0.90 12/13 27
Massachusetts 1.77 1.19 1.25 4 31
Minnesota 1.48 1.60 1.02 I 30
Montana 1.09 1.05 0.85 23 27
New Hampshire 2.19 1.34 0.82 37/38 28
New Jersey 1.55 1.29 0.92 7 28"
New York 1.95 1.48 1.16 3 25
North Dakota 1.65 1.45 1.10 31 25 II. California 0.71 0.68 1.19 6 26
Illinois 0.87 0.77 1.08 18 26
Michigan 0.75 0.66 1.06 10 28
Oregon 0.83 0,56 0.95 9 26c Washington 0.97 0.84 0.95 8 26"
Wisconsin 1.20 0.77 1.01 2 27~
Note: Group I ~ere relatiV~ardized~
health care expenditures per capita. Group II includes states where relative Medicaid payments per recipient are lower ¯ ~,p~.t are nigher ~nan relative personal than relative persona[ health care expenditures per capita.
" States offering at least 25 services and a medically needy program or offering a program ranked in the top 10 by the Public
Citizen Health Research Group in 1987; and Families USA, Le~in/ICF estimates.
~ Public Citizen Health Research Group.
" Some services offered to categorically needy group only.
Source: Health Care Financing Administration, State Medicaid Data Disk FY 89; Congressional Research Service,
M__edicaid Source Hook, Novem~)er 1988, pp. 98-99; Erdman and Wolfe, Poor Health Care for Poor American~:
~Lewin/ICFRankinQ estimates, of State ~edicaid Pro~ram~, Public Citizen Health Research~Group, 1987; and Families U.S.A.,states’ ability to shift costs by tinkering w~th categorically needy
eligibility requirements.
Moreover, as suggested previously, some poor people denied eligibility
to Medicaid are likely to turn to other state programs. Although many other
variables are involved, in states like Massachusetts and New York, where
Medicaid pays a well-above-average share of all personal health care costs,
"other (non-Medicare) public" funds pay a below-average share; in states like
Nevada, New Mexico, Idaho, Texas and North Carolina, by contrast, Medicaid
pays a below-average and "other public" funds pay an above-average fraction of
all health care spending (Lewin/ICF estimates in Families U.S.A. Foundation
]990).
.Improvinq Proqram Efficiency
Whether or not state policymakers decide to eliminate or reduce optional
benefits, they will undoubtedly want to pursue efforts to improve the
efficiency of the Medicaid program. Without such efforts, even a pared-down
program will most likely continue to grow considerably faster than-state
revenue. Unfortunately, the savings that could result from promoting best-
practice delivery and reimbursement systems may seem comparatively modest, but
they will cumulate. By contrast, when benefits are cut, the savings are
immediately apparent. It is the costs that emerge over the long term.
Even so, the short- and medium-term savings to be obtained from best
practice procedures are not inconsequential. Table 8 shows the states
offering the most comprehensive Medicaid programs in terms of number of
optional services provided. As the table indicates, states that offer most
optional services and programs do not necessarily bear above-average costs per
standardized recipient. Indeed, Table 8’s Group II includes states with among
41the lowest per recipient expenditures in the country. While a full
explanation of the remarkable differences in per recipient costs among states
with relatively comprehensive Medicaid programs is beyond the scope of this
paper, the following sections may provide some clues. At the very least,
Table 8 clearly suggests that administrative decisions taken by these states
may matter a great deal.TM
The issue of improving efficiency introduces a whole set of
administrative decisions and procedures. These issues include the need for co-
payments, the value of alternative delivery mechanisms (like health
maintenance organizations) and managed care, alternative reimbursement
methods, volume purchasing, and estate recovery programs.
As mentioned earlier, options for improving efficiency, given current
technology and health needs, fall into three categories: I) increasing the
marginal cost to recipients; 2) putting the provider at risk of paying the
marginal cost of care; and 3) rationing through increased use of managed care.
All across the country state officials grappling with an ever-expanding
Medicaid program are combining these methods in a great variety of ways.
Dozens of experiments are underway in the 50 state laboratories. ~ good many
large corporations, stung by rising health insurance costs, are also becoming
18 This paper will only discuss some of the administrative choices
available within the confines of the Medicaid program -- although the scope
for reducing administrative costs throughout the entire U.S. health care
system appears substantial. For instance, a paper recently published in The_
~ew Enqland Journal of Medicine reports that in 1987 administration absorbed
almost one-quarter of U.S. health care spending compared wi~h 11 percent in
Canada. The authors conclude that the fragmented and complex structure of the
U.S. medical payments .system is inherently less efficient than the Canadian
single-payor system (Woolhandler and Himm~Istein 1991). Nevertheless, the
ability of individual states to remedy this situation appears limited.
42involved.19 They are experimenting with increased co-payments and
deductibles, for example, encouraging the use of preferred provider
organizations (PPOs), even setting up their own health care delivery systems.
All segments of society are groping toward ways to ~ontrol medical costs.
So far, very little consensus exists concerning what works and what does
not, especially since many current efforts merely shift costs from one group
to another. Today’s promising answer often turns out to be tomorrow’s
disappointment.2° For example, not too long ago health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) were being hailed as a preferred delivery mechanism.
Later it became apparent that their relatively low costs partially reflected
favorable selection; younger, healthier people were choosing HMOs while older,
riskier individuals were sticking with traditional indemnity insurance. Yet
subsequent demonstration programs, wherein individuals were assigned at random
to an HMO or a traditional health insurance program, suggested that HMOs can
deliver some significant short-term savings in an experimental setting.
Whether HMOs reduce the cost of providing health care to Medicaid recipients
over the long term has yet to be demonstrated. Moreover, while HMOs appear to
reduce unneeded care and improve efficiency, they cannot slow the underlying
pace of medical care inflation based on technical change or demographics.
Despite this rampant agnosticism, a few observations emerge from all the
conflicting evidence and advice. In the following discussion, the various
administrative procedures that states can use to affect costs will be
19 A survey by A. Foster Higgins, a benefits consulting firm, found that
corporate medical costs rose 21.6 percent in 1990 and absorbed an amount equal
to more than one-quarter of net income (Fettig 1991).
2o Indeed, according to the same survey cited in the preceding note,
half of the corporate respondents believe that their efforts to cut health
care costs are not effective.
43categorized according to whether they involve raising the marginal cost to the
consumer, raising the marginal cost to the provider, or rationing through
managed care.
Askinq the Consumer to Share the Marqinal Cost
As already observed, Medicaid officials face an inherent conflict
between providing access to medical care to those who cannot afford it and
controlling costs. This conflict is highlighted by the use of co-payments to
limit Medicaid recipients’ use of Medicaid services. While increased use of
co-payments to discourage waste by health care consumers generally makes very
good sense, requiring co-payments of welfare recipients might deter some
necessary acute/preventive care and not prove cost-effective in the long run.
The budgetary ~impact of the "nominal" co-payments permitted by federal law is
also likely to be limited. For instance, if one-fifth of all purchases of
prescription drugs were deterred by such co-payments, the average state’s
Medicaid expenditures would fall by less than 1.5 percent--in the immediate
term. If essential medications were forgone, however, co-payments could raise
total Medicaid costs over the longer term. A more promising alternative to
co-payments might be increased use of managed care, as will be discussed
below.
Exceptions to this criticism of co-payments for Medicaid recipients
might include their imposition in cases of inappropriate use of .emergency
wards, and for elective surgery and home/community care--although case
management might again be preferable. One problem with imposing co-payments
for "inappropriate" use of hospital emergency wards is that in many poor
communities alternative facilities simply do not exist.
44Asset recovery. Another potentia7 source of "co-payments" derives from
state efforts to recover assets from institutionalized beneficiaries or from
the estates of elderly deceased Medicaid recipients. The asset of interest is
usually the recipient’s house. Federal law requires states to exclude a
Medicaid applicant’s primary residence from her assets as she spends down to
medically needy levels. However, if a state determines that a beneficiary is
permanently institutionalized, it may deem the house a countable asset and
force its sale, as long as the recipient~s spouse, dependent child (or, in
limited cases, a sibling) does not live in that home. Moreover, under the
same circumstances, federal law permits (but does not require) states to place
liens on a permanently institutionalized Medicaid recipient’s home. (Although
medically needy nursing home residents may not transfer an asset for less than
market value, federal law does not prevent the spouse remaining in the
community from making such a transfer. In addition, Medicaid applicants may
not have made such a transfer within the past 30 months. For some chronic
conditions that develop slowly, like Alzheimer’s, this look-back period may be
too short to prevent asset shifts. These loopholes permit some families to
shift sizable assets to the next generation while obtaining Medicaid coverage
of current nursing home costs. These loopholes need to be closed at the
federal level.)
Three states (Kentucky, Michigan, and Missouri) place no restriction on
an institutionalized Medicaid recipient’s ownership of a home. Another 27
states (including California, Florida ~nd Texas) place no time restrictions on
an institutionalized recipient’s home ownership as long as the beneficiary has
expressed an intent, usually in writing, to return to that home. However, six
states (including New York and Massathusetts) require a doctor to determine
45whether the recipient is likely to return home~ and 13 states end the
protection of a home after six to 12 months of institutionalization (Gordon
and Daniel 1990).
Roughly half the states make provision for recovering funds from elderly
recipients’ estates, but onTy a few, like Oregon and California, currently
have vigorous estate recovery programs. In 1985~ for example, Oregon ranked
first out of 21 states in recoveries as a share of nursing facility payments.
In that year it recovered $4.0 million at a cost of $30~,000. That effort,
which Oregon officials claim was well understood and accepted, yielded over 5
percent of state Medicaid payments to nursing homes and almost 2 percent of
total state Medicaid payments. Following the principle that the elderly have
a responsibility to provide for their own long-term care needs before passing
significant assets o~ to their heirs, this program might bear further
investigation and reinvigoration in most states.
The U.S. General Accounting Office (1989) has estimated that in the
eight states examined in 1985, an average of 14 percent of the nursing home
residents receiving Medicaid owned a home whe~ they applied for assistance.
(The figures ranged from 9 to 21 percent.) Moreover, overSO percent of the
homes owned by the elderly are free of mortgages. Accordingly, at the median
sales price of existing homes in Rochester, New York, nursing home
beneficiaries in New York State may hold roughly $I billion in housing assets
that could eventually be used to repay the state Medicaid program. That
amount represents approximately 40 percent of the Medicaid payments made to
nursing homes in New York in 1989. In other words, placing liens on
institutionalized Medicaid recipients’ homes and exercising them as a matter
of course when permitted seems to be a relatively equitable way to alleviate
46the states’ Medicaid burden--without reducing needed medical care. With over
half of the states facing fiscal problems, such an effort seems preferable to
cutting Medicaid services and programs.
Reducinq the Return to the Provider
Any prepaid delivery mechanism or prospective reimbursement system
requires the provider to risk paying the marginal cost of care. (In this
context "provider" refers to contracting organizations such as HMOs in
addition to the institutions and physicians giving direct care.) An important
advantage to HMOs and similar prepaid provider mechanisms is that they p~esent
strong incentives to minimize unnecessary care. They also foster efficient
delivery. On the other hand, they may encourage the provider to stint on
quality of care.~I For this reason it may be useful to let recipients vote
with their feet instead of forcing them to go to a specifi~ prepaid provider.
While it is important in assessing an HMO’s cost effectiveness to make sure
that it is serving a broad cross-section of patients, allowing Medicaid
recipients to go to one of several HMOs/PPOs rather than requiring a specific
organization might facilitate quality control.
Table 9 provides data on the share of total Medicaid recipients enrolled
in prepaid "capitated" plans. The great majority of these prepaid plans cover
acute care and often are designed for AFDC recipients only. Only four states,
California, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New York, have prepaid plans
21 However, in areas with relatively few medical facilities where
Medicaid recipients may be forced to turn to hospital emergency rooms for
treatment, HMOs may increase the quality of care, because they would permit
ongoing patient-physician relationships. By the same token, channeling
Medicaid recipients to HMOs may not permit the same cost savings as might be
expected from the experience of the general population. In comparison with
the average U.S. health care consumer, Medicaid recipients are likely to have
more severe health problems and to be receiving less opulent health care
currently.
47Table 9
Medicaid Recipients Enrolled in Capitated Plans~ as a Share of Total
Recipients, June 1990
Percent
Texas~ 98.7 Massachusetts 6.5
Indianab 87.2 Missouri 5.9
Wisconsin 28.0 Colorado 4.5
Oregon 24.8 Washington 4.3
Utah 14.1 Tennessee 2.9
Marylar~ 13.5 Hawaii 2.8 Pennsylvania 12.4 New York 2.4 Michigan 11.5 New Harapshire 2.1
Illinois 11.4 Iowa 1.6
California 10.7 Alabama .8
Ohio 10.4 New Jersey .8 Minnesota 7.5 Rhode Island .4
Florida 6.7 North Carolina .1
~These capitated plans include health maintenance organizations (HMOs) providing a con~rehensive
range of services; prepaid health plans (PHPs) which provide a less comprehensive range of services
or services on a non-risk basis; and health insuring organizations~(HIOs).
bln Texas and Indiana the state pays a health insuring organization (HI.O) to act as its risk-bearing
fiscal agent statewide. These HIOs do not arrange for provider services. The plans cover most
services provided by the states’ Medicaid programs.
Source: HCFA, Medicaid Bureau, Medicaid Managed Care Office, "Report on Medicaid Enrollment in
Capitated Plans as of June 30, 1990"~ and HCFA 2082 data disk for FY1989.covering long-term care, and with the exception of California, enrollment in
these long-term care programs is very small. As Table 9 indicates, five of
the six states with comprehensive Medicaid programs and low per recipient
costs -- California, lllinois, Michigan, Oregon, and Wisconsin -- have a
significant share of recipients enrolled in these capitated programs. Their
experiences suggest that these prepaid plans may indeed help to keep per
recipient Medicaid costs relatively low.
Prospective payments systems for hospitals and nursing homes (wherein
reimbursement rates are set in advance) also place the provider at risk of
paying a share of marginal costs. Accordingly, they may provide incentives to
avoid expensive patients. For this reason, best-practice reimbursement
systems should probably incorporate a set of payment categories instead of
using one flat rate. Examples of payment classes include the diagnosis-
related groupings (DRGs) used by Medicare for hospitals, the 16 resource
utilization groups (RUGs) used by the state of New York for nursing homes, and
the relative value scales (RVSs) used by a few states for physicians’
services.
Another crucial issue is the level at which Medicaid reimbursement rates
are set. For instance, New Hampshire and New York (Group I states in Table 8)
have the highest nursing home reimbursement rates in the nation (Kolbert
1991). By contrast, in California (a Group II state) nursing home
reimbursement rates are approximately one-half those in New York -- despite
the fact that per capita personal health care expenditures are actually higher
in California.
Unfortunately~ if Medicaid rates are set well below those for other area
patients, Medicaid recipients will have trouble getting care. Maintaining
49access has been an ongoing problem for the Medicaid program in many parts of
the country. For example, Michigan nursing home operators acknowledged in
federal court that they respond to inadequate Medicaid rates by reducing the
quality of care or curbing access for Medicaid ben~eficiaries (Pear 1990). In
addition, according to a Michigan administrator, with an April i, 1991 cut in
reimbursement rates for physicians, Michigan has "one hel7 of an access
problem" with regards to physicians as well. Not surprisingly, California is
another state that has recently received much adverse press coverage because
of problems with access and quality in its Medicaid program. (See, for
example, Pear 1991a~) And, although New York sets its nursing home
reimbursement rates relatively high, its physician reimbursement rates are
among the lowest in nation. As a result, only one-fourth of New York State
doctors treat Medicaid patients on a regular basis (Kolbert 1991). Indeed,
with their Medicaid rates set between 30 and 94 percent of their Medicare
reimbursement rates, 44 states have trouble getting doctors to participate in
Medicaid, according to the Physician Payment Review Commission (Pear 1991b).
To maintain access for Medicaid beneficiaries (and avoid wasteful cost-
shifting exercises), thus, a best-practice reimbursement system should prob-
ably incorporate an all-payor rate-setting methodology. In an all-payor
system, all third-party payors--Medicaid, Medicare, and private insurance
companies--base their payments on the same rates or r~te-setting methodology.
Table 10 presents information on reimbursement systems used by the
states with relatively comprehensive programs (the two groups of states shown
in Table 8). As Table 10 indicates, all-payor systems tend to be found in
states with above-average Medicaid payments per recipient. In addition, theTable 10




FY1989 1990 Medicaid Pa~ents Personal Health
Medicaid Persona[ Health per Standard Care Expenditures
Payments per Care Expenditures Reciplents Per Capita
Standard Recin." Per Capita FY1980-89 1980-1990 1987 Reimbursement Method
Relative to US Avg. Relative to US Avg, (percent). (percent) Hospital In-Patient
United states 1.00 1.00 114.3 138.7
I. Connecticut 1.30 1.11 197.8 135.2 Prospective, All-Pay exc. Mcare
Maine .92 .90 210.1 150.0 Prospective, Al|-Pay exc. Mcare
Massachusetts " .19 1.25 147.6 136.0 Prospective, budgeted All-Pay exc. Mcare
Minnesota 1.60 1.02 121.0 123.4 ProspectiVe, DRG
Montana 1.05 .85 154.7 139~7 Prospective, PRO
New Harroshire 1.34 .82 292.3 143.6 cost
New Jersey 1.29 .92 IT2.8 139.2 Prospective, DRG, All-Pay incl. Mcare
Ne~ York 1.48 1.16 107.2 124.2 Prospect re, Wo ceils; All-Pay exc. Mcare
North DaEota 1.45 1,10 107.8 149,7 Cost
I|. California .68 1.19 130.4 143.9 Prospective, selective contracting
lllinols .77 1.08 76.1 139~6 ProsPective, selective contracting
Michigan .66 1.06 37.9 134.3 Prospective, DRG
Oregon .56 .95 69.3 146.0 Prospective, DRG
Washington .84 .95 130.5 148.7 Prospective, DRG
Wisconsin .77 1.01 26.4 123,2 Prospective,
Nurs ng Facilities.
Prospective; case mix; ceilings
SNF~ prospective~ ICFs, cost
Prospective budgeted
Prospective, case mi×~ ceilings
SNF-ICFs, prospective; ICF-MR, cost ceiling
SNFs, cost; ICFs, prospective
SNFs-ICFs, prospective; ICF-MR, cost








Key: All-Pay exc. Hcare: ell- payor except Medicare.
DRG: diagnosis-related groupings
ICF;ICF-MR: intermediate care facility; ICF for the mentally retarded.
5NF: Skilled nursing facility.
Note:    Group I inciudes states where ~e[ative ~edicald pay~nts mar recipient are h~gher than re|alive personal health ca~e expenditures per capita,
Group II includes states where relative Medicaid payments per recipient are tower than relative personal health care expenditures per capita.
¯ See Table 8 for selection criteria.
° State Hedicaid payment per recipient, assuming national average recipient mix, relative to U.S, pay~nt per recipient.
Source: HCFA 2082 data disk for FY1989; Congressional Research Service, Medicaid Source Boo~, Tables IV-I and IV-2; and Families USA Foundation 1990.all-payor states have generally had above~average increases in Medicaid
payments per (actual or standardized) recipient both from 1980 to 1989 and
more recently from 1985 to 1989. However, this relatively rapid rise in
Medicaid payments per recipient contrasts with a below-average increase in
total health care spending per person in most of these same all-payor states.
Perhaps all-payor systems reduce the players’ ability to shift costs,
strengthen the overall bargaining position!determination of the third-party
payors and, thus, help to restrain total health care costs. In addition, the
experiences of New Hampshire and North Dakota strongly suggest that
prospective systems are better than cost-based methQds for slowing the growth
in Medicaid (and total health care) payments.
Manaqed Care
Managed care represents a flexible form of rationing that stands a
chance of reducing waste more and transferring costs less than does rationing
by administrative list or limit. Managed care systems could include
screening, second opinions, and peer reviews, in addition to contracts with
managed care providers such as HMOs or individual physicians who oversee
patient care on a fee-for-service basis. On the other hand, although a
currently popular concept, managed care is not a panacea. It may reduce
waste, but it will not slow technological or demographic change. And, a point
often overlooked, its administratlon requires resources.22
Nevertheless, the scope for reducing waste by such methods appears
substantial. For example, the World Health Organization has pointed’out that
~2 In addition, because Medicaid recipients already have below-average
access to medical care and, being poor, aged or disabled, tend to have above-
average medical problems, enrolling Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care
systems may not yield the same savings observed from the population at large."there is no justification for any region to have a rate (of Caesarean
sections) higher than 10 to 15 percent." (Terris 1990) Yet in the United
States the rate is over 25 percent. Other surgical procedures that appear to
be greatly over-used in this country include tonsillectomies, hysterectomies,
and, arguably, bypass surgery. Utilization of these procedures varies greatly
across the states and even from one side of town to another.
One advantage to managed care is that some consumers might welcome it.
Given the pain and inconvenience involved, no one wants to face unnecessary
procedures even at little or no financial cost. Accordingly, consumers might
embrace case management or second opinions as ways of obtaining objective
advice on the most effective course of action. In other words, managed care
could help reduce an important source of market failure that discourages
efficient medical care--the dearth of well-informed and rational consumers.
While doctors may resent case-by-case "peer" reviews, especially by non-
physicians, perhaps they would not object to a periodic report on the rate at
which they perform certain procedures compared to the regional, national, and
"best practice" standards.
On a small scale, the Massachusetts appropriations act of FY1991
contains an example of a peer review program that emphasizes education as well
as immediate cost control and should benefit the Medicaid recipient as well as
the Massachusetts taxpayer. The legislation establishes a drug utilization
review to identify and remedy: underutilization as well as overutilization of
prescription drugs; prescribing and dispensing patterns inconsistent with
norms, acceptable medical practice or program regulation; and risks of patient
harm from drug therapy failure, adverse reactions, or contraindicated d~ug
use. The program is ~Iso required to identify trends in drug utilization in
53institutional care settings (are certain nursing homes oversedating their
residents?) and to assess the effects of new drugs on therapeutic efficacy as
well as program costs.
Similarly, HMOs like Massachusetts’ Harvard Community Health Plan
seek to control costs through an inhouse committee of physicians that develops
guidelines concerning best-practice responses to specific symotoms as well as
best-practice procedures for confirmed diagnoses (Sass 1991). From time to
time individual doctors receive reports on how their own practice differs on
average from recommended practice. Eventually they may be required to justify
such deviations.
Perhaps the states or even the federal government could use such an
approach to slow the rise in national health care costs. Perhaps we could
establish state commissions or even a Federal Health Board, dominated by
providers but including all major third-party payors and some consumer groups,
to develop best-practice strategies and procedures. Then, pooling data from
all major third-party payors, physicians could receive periodic reports on how
their own habits differ on average from the guidelines. Should major
deviations persist, the third-party payors could ask the provider to justify
his decisions. This approach would permit physicians to retain considerable
flexibility in dealing with individual cases; yet it would tackle ineffective
care throughout the state or, preferably, the nation. A comprehensive
approach is important since it is difficult to slow Medicaid cost increases in
isolation. (See Ellwood 1991, for a similar suggestion.)
Governments at all levels, here and abroad, are grappling with the
problem of controlling health care costs. Aareement about what methods work
best is limited but growing. Under these circumstances, state policymakers
54may want to proceed, but proceed cautiously~ with their own carefully
evaluated experiments--with the beneficiaries assigned at random to the
experimental program or to a control group. Other states’ experiences also
warrant serious review. Changes made in haste just for the sake of "doing
something about Medicaid" are unlikely to prove very effective.
VI. Conclusions
As this study has pointed out, financing Medicaid has become a serious
problem for all state governments. Medicaid is one of the largest and
fastest-growing programs in most state budgets, and soaring national health
care costs account for most of the program’s explosive growth. By contrast,
and contrary to widespread opinion, the aging of the country’s population and
the growing need for expensive long-term care have not been the primary forces
driving Medicaid spending over the last 15 years. The success of Social
Security and private pensions in reducing poverty among the elderly has offset
and postponed the likely impact of changing demographics on the Medicaid
program. With the states facing sizable difficulties in funding Medicaid even
now, this finding merely underscores the nation’s need to address the issue of
paying for long-term care.
The per capita burden of Medicaid expenditures varies considerably
across the states. One part of this ratio~ the number of Medicaid recipients
per capita~ reflects each state’s political choices concerning eligibility
criteria, a.s well as differences in the incidence of poverty and the age
structure of the population. In some states a strong economy and low
unemployment rates have until recently offset relatively generous eligibility
criteria, thereby keeping the ratio of their Medicaid recipients to their
55total population close to the national average. Should the downturn continue,
however, the balance may tip, with adverse consequences for these states’
budgets.
Payments per recipient also vary a great deal, even when these
expenditures are adjusted to account for state differences in recipient mix.
Payments per standardized recipient again reflect a range of political choices
concerning the comprehensiveness of the program, as well as differences in
state personal health care costs and the tightness with which these programs
are administered.
Regardless of the big differences in per capita and per recipient
Medicaid costs, the program is absorbing a growing share of state and local
expenditures in every single state. With more than half the states facing
budget deficits, policymakers everywhere are under great pressure to cut
Medicaid. How can they control their state’s Medicaid spending? Policymakers
face two choices. They can shift costs to the private sector by reducing
benefits permitted but not required by the federal government, and they can
make the existing programs more efficient.
Paring the programs back to mandatory levels represents the most
Draconian policy choice. In the four states examined, eliminating all
optional benefits could cut state Medicaid spending by 40 to 50 percent in the
immediate term. The great bulk of these public sector savings would stem from
terminating the medically neeay program or coverage of long-term care provided
by the ICFs. Such an action would concentrate large financial, medical, and
emotional costs on elderly and mentally retarded individuals (and their
families if they exist). The state governments’ savings would be far smaller
on a net than on a gross basis because of the loss of federal reimbursements.
56Moreover, in time, some fraction of these ~~savings" would undoubtedly
resurface within Medicaid or in other income support and health care programs
fully funded by the state. At the very least, the 300-percent rule would
ensure that most long-term care recipients returned to the Medicaid umbrella
almost immediately. The share of the public sector "savings" that resulted in
extra uncompensated care would largely be paid by the private sector through
higher medical and health insurance bills.
Tightening eligibility requirements could also produce large short-term
savings on a gross basis, smaller savings net the loss of federal
reimbursements, and similar feedbacks into state-supported programs. Setting
limits by law or regulation, on the number of prescriptions permitted, say, or
curbing prenatal care to the last trimester of pregnancy, are also unlikely to
be cost-effective.
If state policymakers determine that a drastic restructuring of their
Medicaid program is likely to be unproductive and unwise, they must turn their
attention to the less dramatic but crucially important issue of reducing
inefficiencies in the health care system. Indeed, they must turn their
attention to this problem in any event lest the mandatory portion of the
Medicaid program continue to mushroom at budget-buster rates. Moreover,
examining the states with reasonably comprehensive programs indicates that
administrative issues can make a considerable difference in per recipient
costs.
Nevertheless, states with well-above-average personal health care costs
cannot keep their Medicaid payments per recipient far below average without
developing a serious problem with quality and access. Because Medicaid
operates as part of each state’s health care system, it cannot be reformed in
57isolation. Achieving ongoing savings within Medicaid requires curbing cost
increases throughout the entire health care system.
All sectors of society are groplng for ways to limit rising health care
costs, and little consensus concerning the best approach exists.
Nevertheless, a few tentative conclusions seem possible. For example, co-
payments generally seem out of place in a program designed to deliver health
care to the poor. They are likely to deter needed preventive care and early
intervention.
On the other hand, one form of "co-payment" seems appealing for reasons
of equity as well as for its potential significance to the states.
Reinvigorating state efforts to tap the seemingly significant housing assets
of permanently institutionalized or deceased Medicaid beneficiaries (with
appropriate protection for a spouse or dependent child) could well prove very
productive. In other words, placing liens on institutionalized Medicaid
recipients’ homes and exercising them as a matter of course when permitted
seems to be a relatively equitable and effective way of alleviating the
states’ long-term care burden without reducing needed care. With most-states
facing fiscal pressures, such a step seems preferable to cutting Medicaid
programs and services.
In addition, prospective reimbursement systems or prepaid health plans
show some promise of slowing the rlse in health care c~sts. While all-payor
and case-mix systems may help to ensure that Medicaid recipients receive close
to state average medical care, they .appear less effective than selective
contracting and flat rate systems in curbing cost increases. Nevertheless,
the experiences of many states indicate that it is not possible to holdMedicaid costs per recipient significantly below state per capita personal
health care costs without creating severe problems with access or quality.
Finally, increased use of managed care, although not a panacea, may
yield results as well. Certainly, the scope for ~educing waste by channeling
recipients to managed care providers appears substantial. Moreover, the HMOs’
internal efforts at cost control may suggest a model that could be applied at
the state or national level. In particular, a state or national board,
dominated by physicians but representing consumers and third-party payors as
well, could develop guidelines on cost-effective responses to specific
symptoms and diagnoses. Eventually, physicians whose own practice deviated
substantially from best practice over a significant period of time could be
asked to justify their actions. Such an approach would permit physicians to
retain considerable flexibility in dealing with individual cases but would
increase cost-effectiveness throughout the health care system. And a
comprehensive approach is essential since it is extremely difficult to slow
Medicaid cost increases in isolation.
All in all, many state experiments seem to be steps in the right
direction. In particular, the increased emphasis on managed care, peer
reviews, negotiated prices, and prospective reimbursement systems appears
appropriate. Given the lack of consensus concerning the most effective
approaches, however, any efforts to experiment with "best-practice"
reimbursement and delivery systems need to be designed (and preferably
financed) to permit careful evaluation.
Unfortunately, in the current press of fiscal distress, some state
policymakers may feel driven to make drastic cuts in their states’ Medicaid
programs. But, measures taken in haste without careful evaluation could prove
medically disastrous for some U.S. citizens and fiscally unproductive for the
states.
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Medicaid Payments as a Share of State and Local Direct General





FY 1975        FY 1989
Annual Percent Change in:
M~dicaid    Direct General
Payments     Expenditures
5.3 7.2 9.4 6.3
New York 10.1 12.3 6.6
Rhode Island~ 7.4 11.4 10.8
Massachusetts 7.2 11.1 10.1
Maine 6.1 10.1 12.4
Arkansas 6.0 10.0 10.9
Ohio 3.6 9.0 14.4
Kentucky 3.5 8.9 15.0
Louisiana 4.0 8.7 14.0
North Dakota 3.5 8.4 14.4
Connecticut 4.9 8.3 12.8
Tennessee 3.4 8.3 14.8
Indiana 3.9 8.2 13.2
South Dakota 3.2 8.0 13.1
Oklahoma 5.9 7.9 9.4
Mississippi 4.8 7.5 10.4
West V~rginia 1.8 7.5 18.0
Pennsylvania 5.9 7.5 6.7
Wisconsin 7.2 7.3 5.-4
Vermont 5.8 7.3 8.8
North Carolina 3.6 7.0 13.8
Minnesota 5.3 6.9 9.1
New Jersey 4.5 6.9 10.9
Georgia 5.6 6.8 I0.0
Washington 4.2 6.7 11.3
Illinois 5.7 6.6 5.4
Missouri 2.5 6.6 14.8
Montana 3.6 6.6 11.0
Michigan 5.7 6.6 5.6
South Carolina 3.1 6.4 14.1
Maryland 3.1 6.3 12.0
Iowa 2.9 6.3 12.8
New ~an~oshire 3.7 6.0 12.9
Nebraska 3.4 5.7 9.8
California 5.6 5.6 7.3
Idaho 3.0 5.6 11.3
Kansas 4.7 5.5 7.4
Florida 2.2 5.3 17.9
Alabama 4.4 5.1 7.8
Texas 4.5 5.1 10.1
New Mexico 2.5 5.1 15.0
Virginia 3.3 4.6 10.7
Delaware 2.1 4.6 14.4
Oregon 2.7 4.6 11.4
Colorado 3.5 4.6 9.6
Utah 2.6 4.3 13.1
Hawaii 2.7 4.3 8.9
Nevada 2.1 3.1 13.0
~Yomingb
1.0 2.6 18.1


















































aExcluding Arizona (which has an alternative program to Medicaid), and Puerto Rice,
the Virgin Islands and the District of Coluebia.
°Medicaid data are estimated.
Source: HCFA State Medicaid Data Disk for FY 89 and State Data Tables for FY75;
and U.S. Bureau of the Census.
6OTable A-2







Recipients    Share of Recipients Recipients as
as a share of Population as a Share     a Share of
Total Living in of the Poverty the Poverty
Population Povert~ Populationb Population°
All’ 9.2 14.0 55.6 65.4
Alabama 7.8 21.5 36.1 36.4
Alaska 6.9 I0.4 66.6 66.6
ArKansas 10.1 22.4 36.9 45.0
California 11.7 13.4 66.9 87.7
Colorado 5.8 10.8 52.8 53.5
Connecticut 7.1 7.2 73.1 98.0
Delawared 5.8 11.3 52.1 51.4
District of Columbia 5~9 19.2 72.8 83.0
Florida 7.1 13.3 40.6 53.4
Georgia 9.2 15.6 55.1 58.8
Hawaii 8.5 9.9 68.4 85.8
Idaho 4.7 16.4 27.0 28.5
Illinois 9.0 15.0 47.8 59.9
Indiana 5.6 12.2 44.5 46.1
Iowa 7.9 16.5 44.1 48.1
Kansas 7.1 11.2 45.6 63.3
Kentucky 11.6 18.5 43.9 62.4
Louisiana 11.9 20.8 56.1 57.4
Maine 12.0 11.1 99.2 I07.9
Maryland 6.9 8.5 63.0 81.8
Massachusetts 9.9 8.8 81.4 112.4
Michigan 12.1 14.4 81.8 84.0
Minnesota 7.5 11.5 49.9 65.1
Mississippi 15.5 25.6 60.5 60.5
Missouri 15.5 14.3 108.4 I08.4
Montana 7.6 16.3 40.3 46.5
Nebraska 6.8 14.6 45.1 46.5
Nevada 3.9 12.4 33.4 31.6
New Hampshire 3.3 5.6 47.5 59.3
New Jersey 6.9 9.5 67.9 72.7
New Mexico 7.5 20.7 33.4 36.3
New York 12.6 --15.2, 60.7 82.8 -
North Carolina 7.5 14.0 35.7 53.6
North Dakota 7.0 14.9 30.9 46.8
Ohio 10.4 12.4 84.2 84.2
Oklahoma 7.8 15.5 46.0 50.4
Oregon 7,7 12.6 44.7 61.2
Pennsylvania 9.2 12.4 71.6 74.0
Rhode Island I0.4 11.2 81.7 92.6
South Carolina 8.0 17.6 36.1 45.4
South Dakota 6.2 16.2 30.0 38.5
Tennessee 11.1 17.8 48.1 62.3
Texas 7.0 16.2 37.5 43.4
Utah 5.6 11.9 40.7 46.9
Vermont 9.6 10.2 86.2 " 94.0
Virginia 5.7 10.6 42.3 54.2
Washingtond 9.2 11.7 79.7 78.6
West Virginia 12.8 22.8 50.8 56.1
Wisconsin~ 8.3 11.8 78.0 70.2
~yorningd 6.5 12.3 62.0 52.7
"Estimated for 1985-87 by the Institute for Research on Poverty, University of
Wisconsin - Madison.
°Assuming the poor account for the same shar~ of the total population in 1989 as
in 1985-87.
°Excluding Arizona, which has an alternative program to Medicaid, Puerto Rico,
and the Virgin Islands.
°Reported Medicaid data are not consistent.
Source: Health Care Financiqg Administration, HCFA State Medicaid Data Disk FY89.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1990. University of
Wisconsin-Madison, InstitUte for Research on Poverty, Focus Vol.11, No.3, Fall 1988.Table A-3
Share of Hedicaid Recipients and Payments, by Category, FY1975 and FY1989
Percent
Category
New York Ohio _.. Pennsytvania Massachusetts                  Texas
1975 1989 1975 1989 1975 1989 1975 1989 1975 1989 1975 1989 1975 1989 1975 ~ 1975 1989 1975 1989
Aged: 13.7 15.0 31.6 43.4 14,8 9.1 33.6 30.2 7.7 12.3 41.2 37.1 22.3 18.0 42.5 42.8 34.0 18.3 57.8 36.1
Categoricatly needy 7.5 7.0 5.6 12.5 14.8 9.1 33.6 30.2 4.7 9.8 18.2 31.2 10.9 8.3 8.8 7.6 34.0 17.9 57.8 35.9 HedicalLy needy 6.2 8.0 26.0 30.9 .0 .0 .0    .0 3.0 1.3 23.0 5.3 11.5 9.6 33.8 35.2 .0
Other" .0 .0 .0 .0 1.2 .6 .0 .0 .4 .2
Disabled: 10,5 15,2 24,9 36,2 13,4 12,1 32,4 35,9 7,3 16,0 19,0 33,6 10,7 16,2 21,4 36.1 10,6 11,6 19,2 33,0
CategoricaLly needy T,8 11,1 15,9 19,6 13,4 12,1 32~4 35,9 6,2 14.5 10,7 30,2 8,2 13,5 15,1 22,9 10,6 11,5 19,2 32,9
Medically neeQy 2,7 4,1 9.0 16,6 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 1,1 ,5 8,2 2,9 2.5 2,7 6,3 13,1 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0
Other" ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 1,0 ,5 ,0 ,0 ,I ,0 B[~nd: ,2 ,2 .6 ,8 o3 ,I ,5 ,3 1,1 ,I 1,0 ,I 1,3 1,4 1,3 2,4 .5 ,4 ,6 ,6
Categorically neeoy ,I ,I ,3 ,4 ,4 ,I ,5 ,3 ,9 ,I ,8 ,I .4 1,4 ,4 2,4 .5 ,~ ,6 .6
HedicaLly needy ,I ,0 ,3 ,4 .0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,2 ,0 ,2 .0 ,9 ,0 ,8 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 Other~ ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 AFDC Child: 44.6 43,6 22,1 10,0 45,7 49,9 14.6 18,5 37,3 55,4 9,5 17,2 39,4 36,0 19,2 ’7,1 39,2 46,5 10,3 13.6
Categorically needy 37,0 36,0 18,4 7,4 45,7 49,9 14,6 18,5 33,0 46.5 7,3 13,7 37,2 31.,6 18,9 6,3 39,2 39,5 10,3 10,9
Medically needy 7.6 7,6 3,7 2,6 ,0 ,0 .0 ,0 4,3 6,6 2,2 2,6 2,2 4,4 1,2 .8 ,0 2,2 ,0 ,8
Other’ ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 2,3 ,8 ,0 ,0 4,8 1,9 AFDC Adult: 21,0 20,3 16,9 8,2 25.8 24.5 19,0 13,4 27,4 23,4 13,4 10,0 18,4 21,5 9,0 8,6 15,7 23,0 12.1 16,6
Categor|cally needy 19,1 16,0 16,1 6,4 25,8 24,5 19,0 13,4 24,3 20,3 11,2 8,8 17,4 17,6 8,4 7,0 15,7 16,8 12,1 10,7
Medically needy 1,8 4,3 ,8 1,7 ,0 ,Q ,0 ,0 3,1 2,2 2,1 ,8 1,0 3~9 ,5 1,5 ,0 1,0 ,0 ,9
Other ,0 ,0’ ,0 ,0 ,9 ,4 ,0 ,0 5,2 5,0 Otherb 10,1 5,8 4,0 1,5 ,0 4,2 ,0 1,7 19,8 -7,2c 16,0 2,0 7,8 7,0 6;7 3,1 ,0 ,2 ,0 ,I Memo:
ALl Nursing Facilities 7,5 5,7 36,4 39,7 11,9 8,5 43,5 44,3 5,3 6,9 54,5 50,5 9,7 8,8 46,5 46,8 12,1 8,1 55,9 43,1
lCF/MentalLy Retarded 0,7 0,7 2,9 12,9 ,6 ,7 8,6 12,1 ,0 ,7 ,0 16,2 0,4 0,7 8,1 12,4 1,0 1,0 6,3 18,2
ALt Other 6,8 5,0" 33,4 26,8 11,3 7,7 34,9 32,2 5,3 6.2 54,5 34,3 9,2 8,1 38,4 34,5 11,1 7,1 49,6 24,9
";roups provided coverage by pre-1988 and 1988 legislation.
~nc[uding other TitLe X~X, basis of eligibility unknown and in some cases, adjustments for double counting.
~PubLished data are inconsistent.
Note: ]CF = intermediate care FaciLities.
Source: U.S. HeaLth Care Financing Administration, State Medicaid Data Tables for FY1975 and FY1989, June 21, 1990. Based on data from IICFA form 2082.References
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